日本経済新聞 2008/3/13
天然ガス版OPEC構想 親ロシア国でカルテル
年内にも発足、イラン参加も 米欧揺さぶり狙う
世界最大のガス埋蔵量を持つロシアが、カザフスタンなど旧ソ連の親ロ国と天然ガスの価格や供給網の建設を調整する事実上のカルテルを設立することが明らかになった。イランなどにも参加を要請し、年内にも発足させる。
旧ソ連６カ国(ロシア、カザフ、ウズベク、ベラルーシ、タジキスタン、キルギス)が加盟するユーラシア経済共同体(EurAsEC)が４月にロシアで開く会議で構想を発表する。既にカザフのほか欧州向けガス通過国であるベラルーシが参加に合意した。
EurAsECはロシア、ベラルーシ、カザフスタン、キルギス、タジキスタンの5カ国が2000年に結成に合意、01年に正式発足した。アルメニアやモルドバ、ウクライナがオブザーバーとなり、06年にはウズベキスタンも正式加盟した。加盟国間の関税やヒトやモノの移動の管理を統一して地域の通商貿易運輸を促進するのが狙い。
独立国家共同体（ＣＩＳ）関税同盟を発展、改組しユーラシア経済共同体を発足させることで合意した。
AESはカザフスタンのナザルバエフ大統領が提唱した構想に沿ったものであり、将来的に欧州連合（EU）のような機構を目指している。
まず欧州向け支配 主要輸出国影響力拡大
天然ガス埋蔵量のシェア
(2006年宋、BPエネルギー統計)
ロシア 26.3% 旧ソ連5カ国 2.7% 旧ソ連6カ国 29.0% イラン 15.5% 旧ソ連＋イラン 44.5% カタール 14.0% サウジアラビア 3.9% UAE 3.3% その他 34.3%
March 11 2008
On working meeting of Alexey Miller and heads of gas companies from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
The Gazprom Headquarters today hosted a working meeting of Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Management Committee of Gazprom, Uzakbai Karabalin, President of KazMunaiGaz, Nurmmukhamad Akhmedov, Chairman of the Management Committee of Uzbekneftegaz and Yagshigeldy Kakaev, Chairman of Turkmengaz. The meeting addressed the outlook for cooperation in the gas sector.
During the meeting the heads of the gas companies from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stated that “based upon the interests of the national economies and considering the international commitments with regard to the energy supply reliability and continuity, starting from 2009 natural gas will be sold at European prices”
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2008/3/14 turkmenistan.neweurasia.net
The above information has immediately caused a sensation and produced a number of comments in the Russian and Western media. Most of the commentators have proclaimed the emergence of a gas OPEC in the Central Asia, with members as follows: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and… Russia. Media also anticipated problems that Ukraine will face after the expected rise of gas prices. Above all, the news was considered as the success of Moscow who - by announcing the information - has allegedly hampered the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, instead pushing the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline ahead.
Arkady Dubnov of ‘Vremya Novostey’ wrote:
‘Clearly, the cartel’s emergence has been triggered by American and European diplomatic activity in the region. This activity focused on lobbying an export route of the Central Asian gas to Europe that would circumvent Russia. Paradoxically, Gazprom’s consent for the ultimatum will decisively bury the Trans-Caspian project, backed by Washington. (…) Moreover, it will reinforce the common urge of Russia and its Central Asian partners to construct the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline.
The activity of Brussels and Washington envoys, who have been persuading Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov and Nursultan Nazarbayev to support the Trans-Caspian pipeline, has played a vital part, too. (…). By late February a special US representative in the region Steven Mann actively traveled between Baku, Ashgabat and Astana, luring local leaders with promises of European prices for gas. (…) However, the Central Asian leaders have opted for an easier way of obtaining extra funds for their gas and started joint talks with Gazprom.’
2007/12/20、ロシア・カザフスタン・トルクメニスタン３カ国間で、トルクメニスタンからロシアまでカスピ海沿岸ガスパイプライン（CAC３）の新設すること等について、合意書に調印した。
既存のカスピ海沿岸パイプラインを改修することに加え、2008年後半から2010年にかけてCAC３を新たにカスピ海沿いに新設することが定められている。
Nonetheless, the Central Asian ultimatum issued to Moscow makes me draw different conclusions. In my opinion, it may be a proof of Moscow’s weakness. The ineffectiveness of Russian policy in the region is being cunningly used by Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the key principles of Russian policy in the whole post-Soviet area has been to divide the former republics as much as possible and to prevent them from coordinating their policies. Suddenly it turned out that Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana have joined forces and started dictating their terms to Moscow.
Besides, the fact that Russia may pay ‘European prices’ for the Central Asian gas next year does not necessarily mean that the Great Game is over and that the West and China have nothing to look for in the region. It should be born in mind that the Central Asian states are concerned with something more than just money. They also strive to become politically independent of Moscow and to balance Russia’s influence in the region by cooperation with China and the West. Uzbekistan’s recent permission for Americans to use the airbase in Termez might be an illustration to this point.
Why then did the Russians disclose this information themselves? A simple answer comes to mind: what else could they do? They must have realized that they are no longer dealing with separate states but, willingly or not, they must face the three states together. They also realized that paying more for gas is unavoidable. Therefore Moscow must have decided to use this unpleasant information to cause some confusion around the Trans-Caspian pipeline and to demonstrate that it is capable of paying more for gas, so in this sense the West has no advantage over Russia.
The fact is, something like a ‘Central Asian gas OPEC’ has indeed emerged. However, it is made of three and not four members.
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2008/3/14 eurasianet.org
Russia makes financial gamble to retain control of Central Asian energy exports
Kazakhstan, along with its Central Asian neighbors Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, will receive a huge increase in energy-related revenue following a flurry of regional diplomatic activity. Ukraine, meanwhile, stands to lose the most under the new pricing framework for Central Asian natural gas.
The most important development over the past week or so was a March 11 announcement by the Russian state-controlled conglomerate Gazprom that, starting in 2009, it would pay European market prices for Central Asian natural gas. Gazprom did not specify a price, but given the current market conditions, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can expect to receive somewhere in the range of $200-$300 per 1,000 cubic meters (tcm) of gas next year. At present, Gazprom is paying up to 180/tcm for Central Asian gas. A statement issued by Gazprom said the deal was is "based upon the interests of the national economies and considering the international commitments with regard to the energy supply reliability and continuity."
The deal is certain to hit Gazprom’s bottom line. It could also potentially cause supply disruptions down the road by sparking pricing disputes, likely involving Ukraine, which is the key transit nation for European energy exports. But the Russian conglomerate’s action helps solidify Moscow’s position as the gatekeeper for Central Asian energy exports to Western European markets. Over the past year, the competition over Caspian Basin energy has intensified, with the United States, European Union and China all seeking to break Russia’s current stranglehold over regional export routes.
Gazprom officials have indicated they do not intend to absorb all of the shock of the higher costs, but will pass along some of the added expense to its own consumers. On March 14, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller announced that the gas price for European customers could reach $400/tcm by the end of 2008. Earlier estimates for late 2008 had pegged the price at $310/tcm.
In addition to the price hike, Turkmen and Russian officials on March 12 signed a deal on the transfer of Soviet-era geological and geophysical data covering Turkmen deposits that had heretofore been kept under tight control in Moscow. The information could prove useful to Ashgabat’s efforts to hasten the development of the country’s energy resources. The pact grew out of a joint declaration issued in 2007 in connection with the unveiling of a grand Russian-backed energy export scheme, centering on the expansion of the Prikaspiisky pipeline network. The Russian decision to hand over the data at this time is seen by many regional energy observers as an incentive for Berdymukhamedov to remain loyal to the notion of Russia’s export primacy in Central Asia.
Russian leaders may now be feeling more confident about their ability to stay on top of the regional energy game, but there are plenty of indicators that their position still cannot be considered secure. The Gazprom agreement signals that Central Asian energy producers are developing a sense of unity that could enhance their collective clout in energy dealings with outside players. For most of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia’s cohesion has have been hampered by the inability of regional leaders to work together on a wide variety of economic and social issues, in particular the development of natural resources and the distribution of scarce water resources.
Regional leaders, however, are clearly working to set aside differences. Kazakhstan, which will chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010, has been exerting diplomatic pressure on its neighbors to promote regional stability and cooperation.
One of the region’s more complicated bilateral relationships in Central Asia involves Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Relations had been frosty since 2002, when then-Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov accused the Uzbek government of involvement in an alleged attempted coup against his regime. But on March 11, at the conclusion of a state visit by Berdymukhamedov to Tashkent, the Turkmen leader and his Uzbek counterpart, Islam Karimov, saluted the restoration of friendly ties.
If Central Asian leaders can maintain unity on energy issues, they can become formidable negotiating partners not only for Russia, but for China and the West, regional analysts believe. "The boosting of cooperation in the oil and gas sector between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is capable of dealing a blow to Gazprom’s interests," said a commentary published in the Kazakhstani newspaper Liter noted.
Meanwhile, a commentary published in the Vremya Novostei newspaper indicated that Gazprom did not develop the new gas pricing structure on its own initiative, but instead had to react to new demands put forward by Central Asian officials, who perhaps used the Chinese and trans-Caspian export options as leverage.
"Moscow, which has speculated several times in international diplomacy with the threat of setting up a gas OPEC with other major gas exporters, encountered for the first time a consolidated position from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in price bargaining," the commentary said.
The United States and EU certainly cannot take comfort from the recent developments, which would appear to severely dent hopes for the construction of the planned trans-Caspian-Nabucco export network that would establish a Western-controlled route that ferries Central Asian gas to Europe.
But the biggest loser from recent developments may well be Ukraine, which has long wrestled with Russia over energy supplies. On March 13, Neftogaz, the Ukrainian state energy concern, reached a deal with Gazprom that brought an end to the latest round of bickering between the two countries. Under the agreement, Ukraine fixed the price it will pay for gas starting in March and running for the rest of 2008 at $179.50/tcm
Ukraine faces a severe price increase in 2009, once the higher rates for Central Asian gas kick in. The skyrocketing prices prompted Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to declare that Ukraine would like to conclude a medium-range supply agreement, covering up to five years, with Gazprom.
During the Ukrainian-Russian wrangling over the price of gas, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko headed to Astana for talks with Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The discussions proved bitterly disappointing for the Ukrainian leader, however. Yushchenko had hoped he could tempt Nazarbayev into an export arrangement that cut out Russia, striving to gain a Kazakhstani commitment to the Odessa-Brody pipeline, which Ukraine seeks to expand. Nazarbayev stated clearly that Russia, in control of oil transportation, held the key to any decision. "The question of the Odessa-Brody project remains open. We have to agree with Russian oil transportation organizations to supply the necessary volumes to Ukraine," Nazarbayev told a news conference.
